Post-cognitive approaches to cognitive science, such as enactivism and autopoietic theory, are typically assumed to involve the rejection of computationalism. We will argue that this assumption results from the conflation of computation with the notion of representation, which is ruled out by the post-cognitivist rejection of cognitive realism. However, certain theories of computation need not invoke representation, and are not committed to cognitive realism, meaning that post-cognitivism need not necessarily imply anti-computationalism. Finally, we will demonstrate that autopoietic theory shares a mechanistic foundation with these theories of computation, and is therefore well-equipped to take advantage of these theories.
Introduction
Enactivism and autopoietic theory (AT) are two intimately linked theoretical approaches in cognitive science, both in conceptual and historical terms. They, along with other theoretical approaches such as dynamical systems theory, ecological psychology and radical embodied cognition, constitute the main precursors and representatives of the so-called 'post-cognitivist' paradigm in cognitive science (Fresco, 2014; Gomila & Calvo, 2008; Wallace, Ross, Davies, & Anderson, 2007) . This paradigm, for reasons that will be partially examined in this work, is typically assumed to involve the rejection of the notion of computation as a way of understanding cognition. That is, post-cognitivism is assumed to entail anti-computationalism. Against this view, in this article, we argue that the rejection of computationalism is not an essential component of postcognitivism, and we illustrate the point by analysing the way enactivism and AT relate to computationalism. The purpose of this article is not to assess the enactive approach and the AT with respect to their merits as cognitive theories, but rather to examine their potential compatibility with some aspects of computationalism.
It is essential to make explicit, from the beginning, what we mean by 'computationalism' (and by way of contrast, what we mean by 'anti-computationalism') .
In what sense do we want to say that postcognitivism is compatible with 'computationalism'?
Computationalism, in its traditional sense, is the thesis that computation is necessary (and possibly even sufficient) for cognition. This view presupposes that computation is a real (mind-independent) phenomenon in the world which takes place whenever cognition takes place, and assigns the notion of computation a foundational theoretical role in cognitive science (Chalmers, 2011) . However, there are other ways to understand computationalism aside from this strong ontological and realist sense. The notion of computation can also be used at a purely epistemological level, as a form of explanatory or predictive heuristic. This weaker sense of computationalism does not make any particular commitment to the real ontological status, whether computational or not, of the system that is being explained or predicted. This form of computationalism uses the notion of computation instrumentally, as an explanatory strategy, and does not necessarily assign it a foundational role in cognitive science (cf. Schweizer, , 2016 . Thus, it is possible to distinguish between two senses of computationalism, which we will refer to as 'ontological ' and 'instrumentalist', respectively. Computationalism, in the context of this article, denotes both the ontological and the instrumentalist usage of the notion of computation in cognitive science. Anti-computationalism, as a counterpart, denotes the attitude for which the notion of computation has no interesting role to play in cognitive science, either as an ontological thesis or as an explanatory/predictive formula, as in the instrumentalist sense. Anti-computationalists may nonetheless continue to use computational technologies as part of their research, for example, via modelling or statistical analysis, but we think it is clear that this does not commit them to mentioning computation anywhere in their explanations, and as such does not constitute a form of computationalism.
We will first introduce enactivism and explore the reasons why it has historically been portrayed as an anti-computationalist research programme. This, we will argue, is primarily a case of early enactivists (and others, including early computationalists) conflating the notions of representation and computation. As we will demonstrate in Section 3, following more contemporary mechanistic accounts of computation, representation and computation need not be regarded as intrinsically connected to one another. As a result, the enactivist opposition to representational theories of cognition need not necessarily require an opposition to computational theories of cognition.
However, there is a further reason that enactivists might be opposed to computational theories, which is that computational theories can sometimes seem to assume a 'cognitive realist' stance wherein the existence of a pre-given external world is assumed. In Section 4, we demonstrate that the connection between computationalism and cognitive realism is in fact not so strong, and that one can be a computationalist without being a cognitive realist. Our general purpose is to show that the anti-computational stance of early enactivism should be understood more as a reaction to the mainstream cognitivism of its time, which was largely a representational and realist version of computationalism, than to computationalism itself. We argue that in the current theoretical context, especially having in mind contemporary mechanistic accounts of computation, the anti-computational stance of early enactivism is no longer necessary (at least for the specific reasons that will be addressed here). Finally, in Section 5, we examine the potential for the AT of cognition to integrate computationalism. Building on the one hand on the mechanistic account of computation, and on the other on Schweizer's instrumentalist approach, we hold that AT is compatible with at least an instrumentalist version of computationalism. As such, we conclude that post-cognitivism, in the guise of enactivism and AT (but not limited to these theories), need not necessarily entail anti-computationalism.
Enactive anti-computationalism
The enactive approach to cognition, in its classical or canonical version, is defined by certain central assumptions or unifying themes, one of which is the rejection of computationalism as a research programme (Barandiaran, 2016; Froese, 2012; Stewart, Gapenne, & Di Paolo, 2010; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) . The canonical version of enactivism corresponds to the original formulation introduced by Varela, Thompson and Rosch in The Embodied Mind (1991) , and afterwards developed, usually under the name of autopoietic enactivism, by Thompson (2007) , Di Paolo (2005) , Froese and Di Paolo (2011) , Barandiaran (2016) and others. In this article, when talking about enactivism and its anti-computationalist stance, we will be referring only to this canonical version.
1
The anti-computationalist stance of enactivism has deep philosophical roots, and is grounded, to a large extent, on two related but distinguishable theoretical assumptions. First, enactivism assumes that cognition, at least in its most fundamental sense, does not involve representations. And second, enactivism assumes that cognitive systems are autonomous systems. How do these assumptions lead enactivism to reject computationalism? To answer this question, at least partially, is the main aim of this section.
When the enactive approach was launched as a research programme in the early 1990s, Varela et al. (1991) presented it as a way of replacing and overcoming what they called, following Haugeland's (1978) classical characterisation, the 'cognitivist' paradigm in cognitive science. By 'cognitivist' paradigm, they meant, basically, representational/computational cognitive science, taking representation and computation as two inseparable assumptions of a unitary, and to their eyes incorrect, thesis about cognition.
The main worry of enactivists regarding the cognitivist paradigm was what they took to be its philosophical commitment to metaphysical realism, which they called 'cognitive realism' (Varela et al., 1991, p. 134) . Metaphysical realism, roughly speaking, is the thesis that the world, its objects and properties exist independently of the presence and cognitive activity of the cognitive agents that know them (Khlentzos, 2016) . 2 Cognitive realism, according to enactivists, assumes that cognitive agents face a pre-given world, in the sense that they encounter a world whose objects and properties come already constituted and defined. The problem with this realist approach, for enactivists, is that it leads us to a representational view of cognition:
We assume that the world is pregiven, that its features can be specified prior to any cognitive activity. Then to explain the relation between this cognitive activity and a pregiven world, we hypothesize the existence of mental representations inside the cognitive system (whether these be images, symbols, or subsymbolic patterns of activity distributed across a network does not matter for the moment). We then have a full-fledged theory that says (1) the world is pregiven;
(2) our cognition is of this world-even if only to a partial extent, and (3) the way in which we cognize this pregiven world is to represent its features and then act on the basis of these representations. (Varela et al., 1991, p. 135) Against this realist and representational view, enactivism assumed, perhaps influenced by the idealist trend of some of its theoretical ancestors (mainly phenomenology and second-order cybernetics), a sort of anti-realism. According to enactivism, cognitive agents do not face a pre-given world whose features need to be represented, but co-determine or co-define, through their very existence and cognitive activity, the features of the world they inhabit.
In the realist view, so the enactive argument goes, cognitive systems are depicted as heteronomous systems, in the sense that their cognitive domains are not endogenously generated but pre-specified from the outside. In contrast, enactivism saw cognitive systems as autonomous systems, which, by definition, 'do not operate by representation' (Varela et al., 1991, p. 140) . Autonomous systems do not represent an independent reality; instead, they bring forth or 'enact a world as a domain of distinctions that is inseparable from the structure embodied by the cognitive system' (Varela et al., 1991, p. 140) . The rejection of realism and representationalism was, to a large extent, a consequence of the autonomy requirement.
Enactivism sets forth these notions as criteria to decide whether or not a system is genuinely cognitive. Cognitive systems, according to enactivism, are autonomous systems, and therefore non-representational systems. The interesting point, for us, is that the notion of computation does not appear among these primary criteria. How, then, did enactivism come to reject computationalism? The answer, at least at a certain level of analysis, is simple and straightforward. Enactivists thought (and seemingly still think) of computing systems as inherently representational systems, that is, as heteronomous systems (and as we shall see in the next section, historically they shared this assumption with most of their computationalist opponents).
When Varela and colleagues presented enactivism as a way of overcoming cognitivism (and its associated cognitive realism), the direct target of their critique was not computation per se -there was not a separate and dedicated analysis of computation -but rather the notion of representation: [A] computation is an operation that is carried out or performed ( . . . ) on elements that represent what they stand for. The key notion here is that of representation ( . . .). The cognitivist argument is that intelligent behavior presupposes the ability to represent the world as being certain ways. ( . . . ) What is controversial is ( . . . ) the cognitivist claim that the only way we can account for intelligence and intentionality is to hypothesize that cognition consists of acting on the basis of representations . . . (Varela et al., 1991, p. 40, emphasis added and brackets removed) What was controversial or problematic for enactivism, for the reasons briefly described above, was the idea that cognition involves representation. But since enactivists saw 'computation [as] fundamentally semantic or representational' (Varela et al., 1991, p. 41) , they rejected the notion of computation as a theoretical tool for the study of cognition.
It should be apparent that in these enactivist considerations, there is no explicit and direct analysis of the notion of computation per se, separate from theoretical preoccupations about representation. It is relatively clear, we think, that early enactivism set its agenda as an anti-computational research programme in a derivative way, that is, as a consequence of its nonrepresentational view of cognition.
At a deeper metaphysical level, this tells us that early enactivists associated computation with what they called 'cognitive realism', as if the notion of computation presupposed a commitment to metaphysical realism. Correlatively, computational systems were categorised as heteronomous systems, that is, incapable of 'enacting' their own cognitive worlds, and therefore could not be genuine cognitive systems.
In the next two sections, we will try to show that the enactivist conception of computation, upon which its anti-computationalism was grounded, turns out to be, in the light of more contemporary approaches to computation, a misconception, and that the conditions that enactivism assumed to be essential to computation, namely, representation and realism, are not in fact essential to it.
Computation and representation
In the field of cognitive science and philosophy of mind, the philosophical understanding of computation has historically been associated with the notion of representation. As Sprevak (2010) describes it, the received view in this field 'is that computation must involve representational content' (p. 260). This commitment to representation partly explains the historical antipathy that enactivism has held towards computational theories of mind. However, recent non-representational accounts in philosophy of computation suggest that this commitment might not be necessary. In this section, we will briefly describe the historical connection between computation and representation, before exploring some of these non-representational accounts. Piccinini (2004a Piccinini ( , 2004b describes how the association between representation and computation arose out of early work on computational theories of mind by (Putnam (1967a and b) ) and Fodor (1975 Fodor ( , 1981 , which ended up conflating computationalism about neural processing with functionalism about mental states. The former was a relatively weak hypothesis, which claimed that the functional relations between neural states were in some sense computational, while the latter was a stronger claim that mental states should be individuated according to their functional role (Piccinini, 2004b) . Putting the two together resulted in the kind of computational functionalism defended by Putnam and Fodor, which identified functionally individuated mental states with the physical states of a neurological computer. As Fodor (1981) characterised mental states as the representational states of propositional attitude psychology, this led him to his now famous conclusion that there could be 'no computation without representation' (p. 11). The classical view of cognition as internal symbol manipulation led straightforwardly to the assumption that computation, if it was to be instrumental in our explanations of cognition, must also involve symbol manipulation. It was this kind of computational theory of mind, which assumed the necessity of representational content, which the early enactivists were opposed to.
There is also a second, more pragmatic reason that computation has typically been understood as representational, which is as a way of avoiding the triviality arguments posed by Putnam (1988, pp. 121-125) and Searle (1992, pp. 208-209) . These arguments were aimed at the simple mapping account of computation, which identifies a physical system as performing a computation if there is a mapping between the causal dynamics of that system and the logical structure of the computation. Putnam and Searle argued that any abstract computational description could be mapped on to any arbitrary physical system, potentially rendering the notion of computation trivial. One response to this argument was to add the additional requirement that 'only physical states that qualify as representations may be mapped onto computational descriptions' (Piccinini, 2012, p. 228) , thus limiting the class of physical computational systems to those that are in some sense representational.
In response to the received view that computation requires representation, there have recently been a number of attempts to give non-representational accounts of computation. In this article, we will be focusing on the various mechanistic accounts formulated by Piccinini (2007 Piccinini ( , 2015 , Mi1kowski, (2011 Mi1kowski, ( , 2013 and Fresco (2014) .
3 What interests us most about these accounts is the way they separate the concepts of computation and representation. If these accounts are correct, and the notion of computation does not presuppose the notion of representation, then non-representational theories of cognition might, in principle, make use of some version of computationalism in their theoretical constructions. Second, we are interested in their mechanistic affiliations. They understand computation as a kind of mechanism, and computational explanations as a kind of mechanistic explanation. In Section 5, it will be argued that a postcognitivist theory such as the AT might exploit these two elements in order to cultivate a certain version of computationalism. Other elements of the mechanistic accounts, such as their firm realism about computation, are not essential for the kind of computationalism we have in mind in this article and that we have introduced in the previous section. Computationalism, as we have said, may come with an ontological realist thesis about cognitive systems, but is also possible as an instrumentalist stance that sees computational explanations as useful elements in the construction and development of cognitive theories. The latter is the kind of computationalism that, as we will try to show in Section 5, a post-cognitivist theory such as the AT might embrace. Piccinini (2004b Piccinini ( , 2008 characterises the mechanistic account of computation as committed to two central theses, namely, (1) computation does not presuppose representation and (2) computational explanation is a species of mechanistic explanation. Here, we will focus on the first thesis, leaving the second one for Section 5. Piccinini provides a generic definition of computation, which would embrace what he takes to be all possible varieties of computation (algorithmic, non-algorithmic, digital, analog, etc.). Piccinini (2015) defines generic computation as 'the processing of vehicles by a functional mechanism according to rules that are sensitive only to differences between different portions ( . . . ) of the vehicles' (p. 121). A rule, here, is any mapping from inputs to outputs (and possibly, but not necessarily, internal states), which, so Piccinini (2015) argues, may or may not take the form of an algorithm. A mediumindependent vehicle is such that 'all that matters for its processing are the differences between the values of different portions of the vehicle along a relevant dimension' (Piccinini & Scarantino, 2010, p. 239) . The medium-independent character of computational vehicles allows that a given computation can be implemented in different physical media (which, according to Piccinini, is a stronger condition than multiple realisability). The key point for our discussion is that in his definition, Piccinini refers to computational vehicles in an absolutely neutral way. Vehicles may or may not have representational status; all that matters is that they can be processed by some functional mechanism according to some input-output mapping rule. Triviality is avoided by limiting genuine computational systems to only those whose mechanistic function 4 is to compute.
Mi1kowski's and Fresco's accounts are broadly similar to Piccinini's, in that they ground physical computation in a non-representational, mechanistic framework, but there are also some important differences. Mi1kowski emphasises that while computation may not require representation, in his opinion, representation does require computation. Computational symbols, for Mi1kowski, do not represent anything by themselves, and must be supplemented with a further mechanistic account of representation if we are to have a representational theory of mind (Mi1kowski, 2013; see Chapter 4) . It is important to note here that Piccinini, like Mi1kowski, is not necessarily opposed to representational theories of mind. For both of them, what is important is that computation should not be intrinsically representational, but rather provides a non-representational foundation on which representational account of cognition may be built. For us, what is important is that according to these accounts, and contrary to what canonical enactivism assumed, the notion of computation does not presuppose representation.
Fresco's (2014)'instructional information processing account' specifies that (non-trivial) physical computation must involve 'the processing of digital data in accordance with finite instructional information' (p. 158). A trivial computing system, according to Fresco (2014) , is one that can only perform a single, inflexible, transformation -such as a basic logic gate that, given the same input, will always give the same output (p. 159). A non-trivial computing system, in contrast, is responsive to instructional information 5 provided by a controller of some kind, such as the machine table of a Turing machine. Nonetheless, Fresco remains committed to the non-representational character of physical computation, and his account may turn out to be equivalent to Piccinini's. Moving forward, we will assume that some version of the mechanistic non-representational position is defensible, and that representation and computation are distinct concepts that should be understood independently of one another.
Computation and realism
In the previous section, we reviewed three recent mechanistic accounts of computation that do not see representation as a necessary element for computation. In the light of these mechanistic accounts, the enactivist conception of computation as necessarily involving representation is, so we claim, a misconception, and its resulting anti-computationalist stance turns out to be at least somewhat ill-founded.
However, in Section 1, we saw that the anticomputationalist stance of enactivism has deeper metaphysical roots. The rejection of metaphysical realism in cognitive science, identified by enactivists as 'cognitive realism', was the primary philosophical motivation to reject representation (and hence, computation) as a useful notion to understand cognitive phenomena. Mechanistic accounts of computation present a way of understanding computation that remains neutral with respect to representation, but typically do not engage in metaphysical considerations about the relationship between computing systems and the world. That is, their neutrality regarding representation does not come from a rejection of metaphysical realism, which is, one might assume, the key factor to be addressed according to the enactivist view. Perhaps the notion of computation, despite admitting non-representational formulations, is intrinsically committed to metaphysical realism, in which case the anti-computationalism of enactivists would be, after all, well justified.
Does computation presuppose the kind of realism that enactivists reject? When we see a system in interaction with its environment, and we say that such a system is a computing system, are we forced to conceive of said interaction in realist terms? We think not. We will argue that the notion of computation, at least under some version of the mechanistic approach, does not presuppose metaphysical realism, or at least, not the kind of realism that worries enactivists.
Recall the main concern of enactivists is that cognitive systems should not be conceived of as facing a pregiven world, but rather as constituting it through their very existence and cognitive activity. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the actual relationship between cognitive systems and the world is the one that enactivists defend, we have to ask whether computing systems need necessarily be conceived of as facing a pre-given world.
Relatedly, we have to ask whether or not computing systems may be autonomous systems, for according to enactivists, only autonomous systems enact a world and can be recognised as genuine cognitive systems. 6 Recall that the enactive distinction between autonomy and heteronomy, in the context of the metaphysical concern mentioned above, has to do with whether or not the system has a constituent participation in the generation of its world and domain of tasks. If the system's working, that is, its dynamics, rules, internal states and behaviour, is prescribed from the outside, we can be sure, so the enactivist claims, that the system is a heteronomous one, meaning that it lacks autonomy and does not count as a genuine cognitive system. That is, roughly speaking, the enactive reasoning. But we have to ask, are computing systems, in the metaphysical cognitive sense that matters to enactivists, necessarily heteronomous systems?
To address these questions, let us revisit Piccinini's account of computation. In the generic sense (i.e. the most all-encompassing and neutral sense), computation is 'any process whose function is to manipulate mediumindependent vehicles according to a rule defined over the vehicles' (Piccinini & Scarantino, 2010, p. 239, original emphasis). Notice that to qualify a system as a computing system, in this sense, there is no need to presuppose anything about the metaphysical relationship that the system holds with its environment. Formally speaking, the notion of computation refers only to a kind of process that takes place in a given system, and does not presuppose the existence of an environment for said system. Computational vehicles, to be processed, need not be causally connected or statistically correlated with any source external to the system. As Piccinini and Scarantino (2010) clarify, 'what matters for a computation to be well defined is that the [vehicles] be there [i.e., available for the system], not that they correlate with anything else' (p. 242, emphasis added).
However, concrete cognitive systems, one might reply, exist situated in a certain environment with which they interact, not as isolated systems or abstract entities in a formal domain. The question, then, is whether viewing such systems as computing systems commits us to understanding their relationship with the environment in realist terms. From a mechanistic perspective, it is apparent that a situated computing system, to be conceived of as such, does not need to be thought of as facing a pre-given world in which all of the properties are defined in advance, independently of the system's presence and the dynamics of interaction with that world. If an environmentally situated system is a computing system, it is so in virtue of the kind of processes it performs and the kind of vehicles involved in said processes, not in virtue of its metaphysical relationship with the environment. A computing system, to be such, must work by manipulating medium-independent vehicles according to some rule defined over the vehicles, but neither the vehicles nor the rule need to be specified or determined from the outside. It is true, perhaps, that in the domain of human design, it makes sense for us to treat computing devices as solving pre-specified tasks according to prescribed (engineered or programmed) rules, without needing to question the metaphysical status of their respective relationships with the world. However, from a strictly theoretical viewpoint, the notion of computation does not entail any of these conditions. A computing system can be coherently conceived of as processing vehicles whose nature is endogenously specified, according to rules generated by the system itself. Computing systems may certainly be framed within a realist metaphysics, that is not in question. The point is that such a metaphysics is just one way of framing the working of a computing system, and is not one that advocates of computational approaches in cognitive science are compelled to embrace. A situated computing system may be, without contradiction, a system that codefines the space of inputs that constitute its world, and therefore, at least under enactivist standards, a system that operates within a non-realistic metaphysics. The status of a system as a computing system is logically independent from whether or not it operates in relationship to a pre-given world. Autonomy, in the specific cognitive and metaphysical sense analysed here, is not prohibited for computing systems.
Perhaps this conclusion may look, for some, like a bold metaphysical extension of the mechanistic approach to computation. However, in the broader historical and theoretical context of enactivism as a research programme, this conclusion should not come as an unprecedented surprise. It is well known that enactivism has an important theoretical antecedent in second-order cybernetics, and especially in the work of Heinz von Foerster (Froese, 2011; Varela, 1996) . And it is also well known that second-order cybernetics, especially in von Foerster's version, developed a strongly constructivist (i.e. non-realistic) metaphysics with respect to cognitive phenomena (Segal, 2001; von Foerster, 2003) . Von Foerster's work nicely illustrates that the nervous system can be viewed both as a computing system and as one whose computations (vehicles, rules and transformations) are specified endogenously (Segal, 2001; von Foerster, 2003) . 7 It is curious that, given the familiarity that the first enactivists had with second-order cybernetics, and especially the high regard that Varela (arguably the main founder of enactivism) always showed towards von Foerster's work (e.g. Varela, 1996) , the enactive conception of computation ended up so narrowly associated with 'cognitive realism'.
If our analysis is correct, then, whatever the reasons for this association, the anti-computational stance embraced by early enactivism would be ill-founded not only with regard to representation but also at the metaphysical level of the rejection of cognitive realism. The conception of computing systems as systems that necessarily operate in the context of a pre-given world is, as far as we can tell, just another misconception on behalf of the early enactivists.
Getting free from such misconceptions, we think, might open a space for current enactivists to integrate some versions of computationalism in their research agendas.
AT, computationalism and mechanistic explanations
We have already argued that the notion of computation, especially when understood in terms close to the generic mechanistic sense proposed by Piccinini, does not presuppose commitments to representationalism or cognitive realism. In so doing, we have tried to show that post-cognitivism, in the guise of enactivism, is not necessarily incompatible with computationalism, at least for the reasons that motivated the anti-computationalist stance of enactivism in its foundational stages. In this section, what we aim to demonstrate is something more than a mere absence of incompatibility between computationalism and postcognitivism. We aim to show a specific way in which the notion of computation, understood in mechanistic terms, might fit with a certain version of post-cognitivism. To do that, however, we need to go back to one of the main theoretical ancestors of enactivism, namely, the AT of cognition. The AT of cognition constitutes one of the main theoretical precursors of enactivism (Di Paolo, 2005; Thompson, 2007; Villalobos, 2013) . Like enactivism, AT is a firmly non-representational and non-realistic theory of cognition (Maturana, 1970 (Maturana, , 1975 (Maturana, , 2003 Villalobos, 2015) ; hence its post-cognitivist credentials. As we saw in previous sections with respect to enactivism, none of these post-cognitivist features (i.e. non-representationalism and anti-realism) entail an incompatibility with computationalism. But AT, we think, offers something more than a mere absence of incompatibility with computationalism. AT offers, as we shall see, interesting affinities with it. AT shares a strong mechanistic foundation with the accounts of computation reviewed in Section 3, which places it, we will suggest, in a good position to integrate computationalism. By presenting the way computationalism fits with AT, we aim to provide a concrete example of how postcognitivism might be able to integrate computationalism.
Before starting the analysis, and to prevent in advance some potential misunderstandings, the following clarification is in order. All we aim to argue here is that a certain version of computationalism fits with AT. More specifically, that explaining cognitive systems (e.g. the nervous system) in computational terms is entirely compatible with explaining them according to the precepts of AT. This, notice, is not to argue for either of the following things: (1) that AT, by recognising and exploring this compatibility, would or should commit to a realist ontological view about computation or (2) that AT, by recognising and exploring this compatibility, would or should assign a foundational role to computation in the study of cognition. 8 In cognitive science, it has traditionally been assumed that if we do not conceive of computation as a mind (or observer) independent category, then the notion of computation might become entirely useless. If being or not being a computing system is just a matter of ascription or convention, so the worry goes, then the computational approach to cognitive systems loses any theoretical interest. However, it has been recently argued, particularly in the work of Schweizer ( , 2016 , that a non-realist (i.e. instrumentalist) view of computation does not render the notion of computation useless for cognitive science, for the notion may still play, according to this view, an important explanatory role. As we said at the beginning, we take it that computationalism may come in different degrees and versions. The mechanistic accounts of computation that we described earlier, for example, are committed to a realist ontological view of computing systems; that is, the view that some things in the world would intrinsically be computing systems, while some others would not. Schweizer's ( , 2016 position, instead, exemplifies an instrumental computationalism that specifies some methodological criteria to determine when and how a computational explanation is useful or informative, without any commitment to the intrinsic existence of computing systems. We take it that both positions are coherent and offer different but legitimate versions of computationalism. The less demanding version is the instrumental one, and it is, we think, the version that AT, in a possible first approach to computationalism, might take.
Relatedly, it should be clear that the adoption of computation as a formal explanatory tool in the study of cognition does not require assigning the notion of computation a foundational role in cognitive science. AT, as we shall see, is in a position to adopt computational explanations as a part of its explanatory framework, but it is unlikely, we think, that by doing so, AT is going to assign the notion of computation a foundational role. This, however, should not present any serious inconveniences for integration.
Having clarified these points, let us see how AT relates to computationalism. The first thing that is worth mentioning is that, unlike enactivism and other post-cognitivist theories, AT has never explicitly presented itself as an anti-computationalist research programme. When introduced as a biological theory of cognition in the 1970s, its main targets of critique were, on the one hand, teleological theories of living systems and, on the other, realistic and representational theories of cognition. AT, since the early years until now, has fought against a representational characterisation of the nervous system, without directly targeting the notion of computation (Maturana, 1970 (Maturana, , 1975 Villalobos, 2015) , which is to say, without assuming that computation necessarily presupposes representation. This, at first glance, might seem a merely rhetorical point. Perhaps the autopoietic literature does not allude to computational theories in a direct way, but, one might think, given the post-cognitivist nature of the theory, surely computationalism is among its enemies. On careful examination, however, this does not seem to be the case. As we will show, AT is compatible with at least some version of computationalism, and it seems more reasonable to interpret the lack of direct confrontation with computationalism as an indicator of such a compatibility.
The basic compatibility between AT and computationalism stems, we argue, from their shared functionalist affinity. As is known, computationalism, at least in its classical formulation, is in essence a functionalist theory committed to the 'multiple realisability' of cognition (Putnam, 1975) . 9 Computationalism, in its descriptive and explanatory strategy, privileges a certain level of abstraction wherein what matters are the functions between sets of states, and not the details of the concrete material realisation of those states (Piccinini, 2015) . What is not so well known is that AT is also fundamentally a functionalist theory of cognition. This, for those who have approached AT through its links with enactivism, may sound quite odd. Usually associated with enactivism, one would imagine that AT is strongly committed to an embodied view of cognition, where the vital materiality of biological systems cannot be overlooked in favour of functionalist abstractions (see, for example, Wheeler, 2010) . However, although AT is originally concerned with the cognitive domain of biological organisms, it is not committed to the idea that cognition can only be instantiated on biological substrates. Cognitive domains, according to AT, can be recognised whenever a system in interaction with its environment exhibits structural plasticity, regardless of the particular material composition of the system, or whether the system is 'alive' or not (Maturana, 2003) . Furthermore, not only is cognition not intrinsically tied to a biological substrate, but high level phenomena such as human-like consciousness, according to the theory, may in principle be developed in non-living artificial systems (Maturana, 1995) .
AT's functionalism is clearly expressed in its strong mechanistic orientation, which informs both the general ontology and the explanatory strategy adopted by the theory. 'Our approach will be mechanistic: no forces or principles will be adduced which are not found in the physical universe' (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 75) . For AT, to adopt a mechanistic approach is to adopt, first, a physicalist (although not necessarily reductionist) ontology. Yet within that ontology, 'our interest will not be in properties of components, but in processes and relations between processes realized through components' (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 75) . To adopt a mechanistic approach now means to look for a certain level of abstraction, focusing on the organisation of relations and processes rather than on the material instantiation of the components involved in those relations and processes. The functionalist flavour of this strategy, which AT identifies with 'mechanicism', is neatly illustrated through the following comparison:
An explanation is always a reformulation of a phenomenon showing how its components generate it through their interactions and relations. ( . . . ) Thus, to explain the movement of a falling body one resorts to properties of matter, and to laws that describe the conduct of material bodies according to these properties ( . . . ), while to explain the organization of a control plant one resorts to relations and laws that describe the conduct of relations. In the first case, the elements used in the explanations are bodies and their properties; in the second case, they are relations and their relations, independently of the nature of the bodies that satisfy them. ( . . . ) This mode of thinking is not new, and is explicitly related to the very name of mechanicism. (Maturana & Varela, 1980, pp. 75-76, emphasis added) AT's mechanistic orientation offers a possibility for the integration of mechanistic computationalism, approached specifically as an explanatory strategy. According to AT, scientific explanations are, essentially, mechanistic explanations.
10 Laws or other kinds of nomological regularities, when available, can be included in the explanatory formulation, but they are not, so AT assumes, essential to it (Maturana, 1990 (Maturana, , 2000 . This, taking into account that AT is fundamentally a biologically grounded theory, should not come as a surprise, given the prominent use of mechanistic, rather than nomological, explanations in biology (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010; Craver & Darden, 2013) . According to AT, a scientific explanation is composed of four basic steps (Maturana, 1990; Maturana & Varela, 1987) :
(a) Describing the phenomenon to be explained; (b) Proposing a mechanism capable of generating, conceptually or concretely, the phenomenon to be explained (explanatory hypothesis); (c) Obtaining from (b), deductively, other phenomena not explicitly considered in the explanatory hypothesis, and also describing their conditions for observation; (d) Observing these other phenomena obtained from (b).
The key point for us is that the explanatory hypothesis (b) corresponds to a description of a mechanism that generates or produces the phenomenon to be explained. The mechanism can be formal (conceptual or mathematical) or concrete (e.g. a concrete physical model). Points (c) and (d), on the other hand, have to do with a sort of testability condition. They establish that, from the mechanism, we should be able to deduce certain additional observations which, whenever possible, must be tested as predictions.
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For simplicity, let us assume the predictions can be tested. If they are successfully tested, then one can say that the system involved in the phenomenon to be explained implements or instantiates the proposed mechanism. At this point, it should be relatively easy to see the way mechanistic computationalism may fit with AT. Recall that one of the central theses of mechanistic computationalism, according to Piccinini, is that computational explanation is a species of mechanistic explanation. Under this construal, if cognitive systems, according to AT, are to be explained mechanistically, then in principle they might be explained computationally. If all this is correct, then computational explanations may perfectly well form a part of AT's mechanistic explanatory framework.
AT, as we can see, has the potential to accommodate some form of computational explanation in its explanatory framework, and in that way, to retain the notion of computation as a useful theoretical element in the study of cognitive systems. This form would be given, essentially, by a mechanistic version of computational explanations, understood in a broader epistemological framework. This, we think, is a modest but important way in which AT proves to be compatible with computationalism. It is modest because by embracing computational explanation, AT is in no way endorsing a strong computational theory of mind, but is rather just utilising an implementational approach to computation. Biological systems, including the brain and the nervous system, to the extent that they can be explained computationally, can be said to implement computations. This, however, is not a minor point. It shows that post-cognitivism, at least in one of its versions, is compatible with some version of computationalism.
Conclusion
We have argued that post-cognitivism, construed as a broad family of theories and approaches including both enactivism and AT, need not be committed to an anti-computationalist attitude -it is in this sense that post-cognitivism does not (necessarily) entail anticomputationalism. In Section 2, we argued that enactivism's traditional anti-computationalist stance results from an early (and overly narrow) understanding of computation as essentially involving representation. In Section 3, we presented three mechanistic approaches to computation as a demonstration that computation need not necessarily involve representation. In Section 4, we addressed the more fundamental issue of cognitive realism, a rejection of which underpins enactivist anti-computationalism, and we demonstrated that this too is not a necessary requirement for computation. Finally, in Section 5, we presented AT as an alternative postcognitivist tradition that perhaps has more in common with mechanistic approaches to computation, and provides the basis for a potential union of post-cognitivist and computationalist approaches to cognitive science.
Moving this possibility forward, however, would still require some non-trivial philosophical adjustments, as there are other important post-cognitivist assumptions regarding cognitive systems that might obstruct the way. Notably, for example, the canonical enactive and autopoietic views hold that cognition, at the most fundamental level, does not involve information processing (Maturana, 1975; Maturana & Varela, 1980; Varela et al., 1991) . Mechanistic accounts of computation such as Fresco's and Mi1kowski's explicitly identify computation as a kind of (non-semantic) information processing (Fresco, 2014; Mi1kowski, 2013) , and it is not entirely clear whether Piccinini's version, pace (Piccinini and Scarantino, 2010) , may be coherently construed as totally independent from any notion of information (Mi1kowski, 2013) . Thus, a full integration between an enactive or autopoietic version of post-cognitivism and computationalism would require, among other things, elucidating exactly what sense of information (e.g. structural, statistical, instructional, semantic), if any, is required for computation, and whether information, in that sense, would be problematic for these theories. Once this point has been clarified, hopefully in future work, we will be in a better position to reassess the possibility of integration between enactive/autopoietic post-cognitivism and computationalism.
Physical Computation for some preliminary concerns). One alternative possibility would be adopting Craver's (2013) perspectival account of mechanistic functions. 5. There is a further question here about the extent to which enactivism could accept any account of computation that relies on some notion of information, whether that notion be instructional, semantic or statistical. In the interests of concision and clarity, we will not be addressing that question here, although we will note that it remains unaddressed. It is possible, for instance, that enactivism could accept statistical information while rejecting semantic or instructional information, which would rule out at least Fresco's account, and perhaps Mi1kowski's. We leave these as questions for future research, and will limit the current discussion to the issues of representation and cognitive realism. 6. We have argued elsewhere (Villalobos & Dewhurst, 2017) that computational systems may, under some physical implementations, exhibit autonomy in the enactivist sense. Our argument in this section is somewhat different, and focuses more closely on the question of cognitive realism. 7. Although von Foerster does not elaborate an explicit and dedicated analysis about whether a computational approach to the nervous system is consistent with a constructivist one, his work can be viewed as a nonproblematic application of such a combination. 8. Neither will our argumentation touch upon the discussion about whether or not autopoietic systems, if understood as forming a subclass of Rosen's (M,R) systems, are Turing computable systems (Letelier, Marı´n, & Mpodozis, 2003) . If the answer is negative, so the discussion goes, it might imply an incompatibility between autopoietic theory (AT) and computationalism (Ca´rdenas, Letelier, Gutierrez, Cornish-Bowden, & Soto-Andrade, 2010; Letelier et al., 2003; Letelier, Soto-Andrade, Guı´n˜ez-Abarzu´a, Cornish-Bowden, & Ca´rdenas, 2006; Mossio, Longo, & Stewart, 2009) . Whatever the result of this discussion, it should be clear that our central argument does not depend directly on it. Our primary concern is not about autopoietic systems (i.e. living systems), but about the AT as a theory of cognition, and not about computability but about explainability. We try to show that the way AT explains cognitive systems is compatible with the use of computational explanations, where these are understood as a kind of mechanistic explanation. When addressing living beings from a cognitive point of view, cell metabolism (i.e. autopoiesis) is not the kind of process AT is interested in, but rather the overall behaviour of that system, and the internal neural mechanisms that generate said behaviour. Even if the metabolic network of an autopoietic system, interpreted in terms of Rosen's (M,R) systems, were not computable by any means, computational explanations of a living being's behaviour in terms of neural (or other kinds of internal) mechanisms, so we argue, could still have a useful role to play in cognitive science. 9. This is not to say that computationalism entails, as a matter of logical necessity, functionalism (neither the converse). We are just saying that computationalism, in the context of cognitive sciences, traditionally comes in combination with functionalism. For a detailed distinction between these concepts, see Piccinini (2010) .
10. It is worth mentioning that AT's mechanistic approach to scientific explanation has been elaborated and developed independently of the (relatively recent) stream in philosophy of science known as 'the new mechanical philosophy' (Craver & Tabery, 2016) . The latter, represented in the work of authors such as Craver, Bechtel and Piccinini himself, is typically associated with a firm scientific realism, which contrasts with the non-realist epistemology of AT. This contrast is important but does not represent an obstacle for our central argument. Our argument is not that AT should adopt the 'new mechanical philosophy', but that it might take advantage of the mechanistic account of computation and thus make use of, within its own epistemological framework, computational explanations. 11. This testability condition might be reasonably relaxed, and is not essential for our argument regarding the compatibility between AT and computational explanations. Testability, especially in the case of systems that are not tractably predictable (of which the nervous system might be an example), is too strong a requirement. A hypothetical mechanism from which we cannot obtain testable predictions is not necessarily one that lacks scientific validity or explanatory power.
